

Love and Hatred

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Plato finds it evident that love is to be analyzed conjointly with hatred.¹ While hatred has all but disappeared from contemporary philosophical analysis, it did not disappear, of course, from everyday life and from relations within and between countries, religions, political parties, families, and so on. Why then do today's ethicists not address hatred as love's counterpart? In this paper, we offer an account of love's and hatred's role in motivation and of their respective normative status. Recent contributions argue that love supplies reasons: final reasons on one view, defeasible reasons on others.² A plausible account, we agree, aims to capture love's prominent role in motivation. Nevertheless, we argue, love provides neither final nor defeasible justification—for otherwise the same would apply to hatred, a line of thought we consider a *reductio ad absurdum*.

We start with an argument to the effect that hatred is worthy of study insofar as it is a feature of ethical and political life, a feature that is in general, though not necessarily in every instance, bad (section 1). We offer an analysis of love and hatred as asymmetrical opposites (section 2) and argue that love and hatred are not merely directed at persons, but also at activities, objects, and values; they structure pursuits and thus play a central role in an agent's conception of a good life (section 3). Based on these preparatory steps, we lay out our joint account of love and

¹ The *Lysis*, an early dialogue on *philia*, starts from the assumption that the following relationships are in need of analysis: X loves Y and Y loves X, X loves Y and Y doesn't love X, X loves Y and Y hates X; X hates Y and Y hates X, X hates Y and Y doesn't hate X, X hates Y and Y loves X. *Republic* I (331e-335d) examines and rejects the principle "help friends, harm enemies." Again, it is stipulated that love and hatred are to be analyzed jointly. Cf. also chapter 2 in Mary Whitlock Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 26-59.

² Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Michael Smith, "The 'What' and 'Why' of Love's Reasons," in *Love, Reason, and Morality* ed. by Esther Kroeker and Katrien Schaubroeck (London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2016), 145-162.

hatred, proposing that in many ways both play analogous roles in an agent's motivational system (section 4). Love and hatred come apart most distinctively, we argue, in their normative status. After rejecting other options (section 5), we argue that a compelling account of love's and hatred's normative status must appeal to whether an agent's pursuit, and thereby her conception of a good life, tracks value (section 6). Both love and hatred, we conclude, can be locally justificatory. Whether a given instance of love and hatred locally justifies depends on its relation to an agent's conception of a good life (section 7).

1. Why hatred?

When love and friendship resurfaced as topics in ethics in the 1980s, philosophers were immersed in debates about the impartial stance that modern moral philosophy takes to be required. If we are to be impartial toward everyone, philosophers asked, where does this leave love and friendship?³ The 1980s also saw a revival of interest in ancient ethics. Philosophers aimed to make the views of Plato and Aristotle relevant to today's interests. And yet, ethical theories which start from an agent's desire for happiness (as arguably Plato's and Aristotle's do) can appear to be not ethical theories at all. Surely, the thought goes, ethics should address how we are to interact

³ L.A. Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul., 1980; Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," in his *Moral Luck*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 1-19; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 13 (1984): 134-171; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," in: *Philosophical Studies* 43 (1983): 83-99; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976): 453-466; Marcia Baron, "Impartiality and Friendship," *Ethics* 101 (1991): 836-857; Marilyn Friedman, "The Impracticality of Impartiality," *Ethics* 101 (1991): 818-835; Samuel Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 as well as Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; and recently Barry Maguire, "Love in the Time of Consequentialism," *Nous* (2016): 1-17. For the view that love and morality are inherently in tension, cf. Alexander Nehamas, "A Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art." In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* 23 (2002): 189-231; Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kenning, "Friendship and Moral Danger," *Journal of Philosophy* (2000): 278-296.

with others. This objection, too, prompted renewed interest in friendship and love.⁴ Ancient ethics, it was argued, captures sociability by attending to the roles of love and friendship—and more generally, relationships and responsibilities—in human life.⁵ The two late 20th century debates have much in common. In both instances, a prominent outlook in ethics seemed to neglect the positive roles love and friendship play in human action. Work on friendship and love responds to this lacuna, which goes some way toward explaining how philosophers came to overlook hatred. In effect, only those attitudes were analyzed that have some claims to being ethically praiseworthy.⁶

Against this trend, one may insist that hatred should be studied because like love it is a real, and forceful, feature of everyday life. With respect to other features of social and political life, philosophers have argued that the study of ideals may not be sufficiently sensitive to real-life dynamics. For example, Elizabeth Anderson and others argue that racial inequality may not show up in traditional theories of equality. And yet it seems far-fetched that political philosophy be oblivious to it.⁷ Philosophy, then, should analyze entrenched inequalities directly, rather than suppose that all we need to know about inequality can be derived from an ideal theory of equality.⁸ Analogously, we submit, the study of hatred may lead to insights that the analysis of love by itself

⁴ John Cooper's "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship" (1977) and "Friendship and Good in Aristotle" (1977), both reprinted in his *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 312-335 and 336-355, spearheaded this trend. In an interview on December 2, 2016, at the occasion of his retirement, John Cooper was asked what prompted his interest in friendship. In reply, he said that John Rawls challenged Cooper's aim to make ancient ethics a viable interlocutor today. Rawls argued that it seemed the agent of ancient ethics is just concerned with her own life. Cooper, by his own account, wrote his influential papers in reply to Rawls's challenge.

⁵ Scholars turned to Plato's *Lysis* and *Symposium*, Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* on friendship, and the Stoic claim that wise persons are each others friends (cf. Vogt, *Law and Reason*, New York: Oxford University Press 2008, chapter 3).

⁶ Though Frankfurt (2006) departs in many ways from standard approaches in moral philosophy, he too does not include hatred in his analysis.

⁷ Elizabeth Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?" *Ethics* 109 (1999): 287-337, and *The imperative of integration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.

⁸ The Urtext of ideal political philosophy, Plato's *Republic*, goes some way toward addressing these concerns. Two out of the ten books of the *Republic*, VIII and IX, aim to understand perfect injustice as well as imperfectly unjust conditions.

may not bring to light. With this proposal we do not set out to vindicate hatred. Instead we suggest that love is better understood if examined jointly with its counterpart.⁹

Why not go all the way and ask whether hatred is in itself a valuable attitude, if only it has the right object? The Christian tradition and modern virtue ethicists tend to hold that it is virtuous to love the good and hate the bad.¹⁰ Hatred, according to this tradition, is the attitude one *should* display toward the bad, just as love is the attitude one should display toward the good. Do we simply presuppose that this conception of virtue is misguided? One part of our response is terminological. We suspect that some proponents of the love/hate conception of virtue understand hatred in a less robust way than we do, taking it just to be a con-attitude. We concede that, on any plausible conception of virtue, a good person has con-attitudes toward the bad. The notions of love and hatred that seem compelling to us, however, pick out more forceful motivations. Hatred, we argue, is bound to have a deep impact on an agent's psychology, structuring her motivations to a significant extent. Accordingly, the idea that the good person hates the bad becomes rather implausible. Given the way the world is, most people being in one way or another less than virtuous, an agent who hates vice has ample opportunity to do so. If the virtuous agent hates the bad, and if hatred is the forceful motivator we think it is, this agent is destined to be consumed by manifold and pervasive hatred. This, we take it, makes for an implausible conception of virtue.

⁹ Cf. Cass Sunstein's work on the question on disagreement and group polarization, "The Law of Group Polarization," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 10 (2002): 175-195, and "Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics," *Harvard Law and Public Policy Journal* 429 (2002): 429-440.

¹⁰ Augustine, David Hume, and more recently Tom Hurka accept this view. In *Letter 211*, Augustine speaks with seeming approval of *odio vitiorum*, hatred of vices. On Hume, cf. Christine Korsgaard, "The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics," *Hume Studies* 25 (1999): 3-41. Hurka defends this conception of virtue in *Virtue, Vice, and Value*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. G.E. Moore calls hatred a vice in *Principia Ethica* (1903, V §126); at the same time, he seems to think that if wickedness already exists, it is an appropriate object of hatred (V, §133). In ancient ethics, the picture is less clear. In accounts of education to virtue, for example in Plato's *Laws* (653b-c and 654 c-d) as well as some passages in Aristotle (*NE* III.11, X.1, IV. 3 and 8), taking pleasure and pain in what one ought to take pleasure and pain in is also described as loving the good and hating the bad or vice. At the same time, in-depth discussions of virtue acquisition as acquisition of the right affective attitudes work primarily (*Republic* II-III) or exclusively (*NE* II. 1-6) with pleasure/pain terminology (disliking the bad, etc.). The Stoics explicitly reject hatred as a tumultuous and irrational state of mind. Their set of rational emotions (the emotions of a wise agent) contains analogues to three out of four basic passions: the wise person has affective attitudes to present goods, to future goods, to future bads (attitudes of caution), but not to present bads. "Moral hatred" at times figures in the discussion of the Christian virtue of mercy. Cf. Jeffrie C. Murphy and Jean Hampton (eds.), *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

The other part of our response appeals to everyday intuitions. Today hatred is often (and in our view rightly) seen as an attitude that negatively affects the hating agent's psychology as well as social and political interactions. Hatred, as these things are colloquially put, eats away at an agent's state of mind and at the social fabric. This idea is invoked, for example, when hate-crimes are found to be particularly heinous.¹¹ The destructive effects of hatred appear to us reflective of its very nature; its bad effects do not show hatred to be bad in merely instrumental fashion.¹² This is analogous to ways in which virtue shapes an agent's state of mind and psychology in positive ways. The effects of virtue are not mere instrumental reasons for valuing it. They reflect the very nature of virtue.¹³ In this sense, we shall assume that hatred is bad, in a manner that blends the inherent and the instrumental: it is bad on account of the effects it has by its very nature. For now, we consider this a hypothesis. As we proceed to give an account of love and hatred and their objects, it may turn out that though in general hatred is bad, some instances of hatred are less bad than others; some may be harmless; and some may on the whole not be objectionable.

2. Opposites

Love and hatred are opposites.¹⁴ Perhaps the most basic thing to say in a joint theory of love and hatred is that they differ from each other via their relation to another pair of opposites: the good

¹¹ The law recognizes hate crimes as special cases, in part based on the assumption that such crimes have social and political repercussions beyond the immediate effects on the victim.

¹² Plato's *Republic* proposes that justice is by itself good insofar as it is good-making (cf. especially 357a-358a). This view cuts across today's distinction between inherent and instrumental value. There are effects of goodness that are reflective of its nature. To value goodness on account of these effects is to value goodness inherently.

¹³ This is how the goodness of virtue is spelled out throughout ancient ethics: as being good for the state of mind or soul of the agent who is virtuous and analogously, as being good for (sustaining, ordering, etc.) a society.

¹⁴ We shall use the notion of opposite in a way that observes the difference between contradictories and opposites. Love and non-love are contradictories; love and hatred are opposites. Elie Wiesel famously said that indifference is the opposite of love and the "epitome of evil" (*US News & World Report*, 27 October 1986). The question of how his notion of indifference relates to hatred goes beyond the purposes of this paper.

and the bad. With respect to the good and the bad, philosophers are sometimes attracted to an idea Augustine explores: that the bad is merely the privation of the good.¹⁵ The bad, on this proposal, is not as fundamental a property as the good. Instead it is the absence of the good. On a scale, the thought goes, things are getting worse the more they fail to be good.¹⁶ Whether or not this idea is compelling is not our present topic.¹⁷ We invoke it in order to make an observation about opposites: they can be thought to relate to each other in more than one way. With respect to privations, there are three options for how a pair of opposites A and B may relate: (i) B is A's privation, but A is not B's privation; (ii) A and B are each others' privations; (iii) A is not the privation of B and B not the privation of A.¹⁸ Love and hatred, we submit, are of the third sort: neither is the privation of the other. This matters for the method by which love and hatred are to be studied. If hatred is not the privation of love, an account of hatred can not, or not entirely, be given in the terms that a theory of love supplies. This leaves space for asymmetry: love and hatred may differ in such a fashion that not every insight into love translates into an insight into hatred, and *vice versa*.

Along these lines, compare love and hatred to pleasure and pain. Theorists of pleasure and pain tend to propose joint accounts for some, though not for all, aspects in the analyses of pleasure and pain. In discussions of virtue acquisition, the habituation of pleasure and pain attitudes is addressed jointly.¹⁹ At the same time, it has been argued that pleasure and pain make different contributions to well-being; that the experiences of pleasure and pain are mediated by different

¹⁵ Cf. Augustine's *Confessions* (2.8.16.). Cf. *City of God*, Part 2, Book XII.6-7 on abandonment of the good and the evil will.

¹⁶ Another option for a scalar account has been defended by John Broome, who argues that the good simply is that which is better than something else. "Goodness is reducible to betterness" (reprinted in his *Ethics out of Economics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). We are grateful to Ralph Wedgwood for discussion of this position.

¹⁷ On bad and evil, cf. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968; M.G. Singer, "The Concept of Evil," *Philosophy* (2004) 79: 185-214; Russ Shafer-Landau, *Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Luke Russell, *Evil: A Philosophical Investigation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁸ (i) is exemplified by the privative account of good and bad; (ii) is exemplified by Epicurus' account of pleasure and pain, which defines each as the absence of the other; (iii) is exemplified by desire and aversion.

¹⁹ Classical treatments of this kind include Plato's *Republic* II-III and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* II.1-6.

cognitive systems; and that pleasure and pain bear different relationships to our motivational systems.²⁰ Pleasure and pain are also studied together as the kinds of (dis)values they are. Here too, however, not everything that applies to pleasure may apply conversely to pain, and *vice versa*. For example, Thomas Nagel thinks that the pain of other people provides us with immediate reason to help them avoid or counteract it. We do not have the same immediate reason to help others sustain or attain pleasure.²¹ Relatedly, Nagel thinks that, even though to inflict pain on someone can all things considered be the right thing, the inherent badness of pain makes it psychologically hard. This psychological difficulty, Nagel says, captures a normative truth. In his metaphor, to intentionally inflict pain is like swimming against the normative current.²² In sum, theorists find it conceivable that, even though pleasure and pain are usefully studied together, there are insights to be gained about pleasure that do not have analogues in pain or implications for pain, and the other way around.

This is roughly what we suggest for love and hatred. We propose that a joint account of love and hatred should cover what is analogous in both. Beyond this there are theoretical insights into love that have implications for hatred, and the other way around. And some features of love and hatred are specific to each. This asymmetry is important to our proposal. Similar to Nagel's idea of a normative current, we assume that love and hatred are not simply on par. This means, *inter alia*, that even if there were situations where hatred is an appropriate attitude, these would be situations where agents swim against the normative current; or in less fancy terms, hatred's association with the bad taints such cases regardless.

²⁰ Adam Shriver, "The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Subjective Well-Being," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 5 (2014): 135–153. Cf. K.C. Berridge and M.L. Kringelback, "Pleasure System in the Brain," *Neuron* 86 (2015); Guy Kahane "Pain, Dislike, and Experience," *Utilitas* 20 (2008).

²¹ *The View from Nowhere* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986), p.160-161 and 170.

²² (1986), p. 182.

3. Broad Notions of Love and Hatred

Traditional theories of love tend to focus on person-directed love. In our account, love and hatred for persons are important, though by no means the only genuine instances of love and hatred. Nevertheless, we take on board an implication that three traditional theories of person-directed love share. The Love All Theory says that one should love all human beings. A good person, it is argued, loves everyone and aims to benefit everyone.²³ This implies that one should hate no one. The Love For Persons Theory reacts to a perceived problem in the Love All Theory. Presumably, human beings simply do not have sufficient psychological energy to love everyone.²⁴ But everyone deserves to be loved, for what makes people adequate objects of love is their personhood. In loving some people—those whose value as persons one is sensitive to—one loves some of all; and all are in principle love-worthy.²⁵ The Love For Persons Theory, thus, also implies that one should hate no one. Finally, the Partiality Theory says we love those who we are partial to, while we are to be impartial toward the rest.²⁶ It too implies that one should hate no one. Arguments explored in these traditions could be rehearsed, about the nature of goodness, the value of each person, and so on. But we shall take the common ground between these views on board without further argument: one should not hate any persons. This does not supply sufficient reason, however, to adopt the view that hatred is always wrong. As noted a moment ago, some philosophers think one should hate the bad, where this is understood to be vice or disvalue. Similarly, it is not clear that a person could not blamelessly hate, say, broccoli.

²³ This view is defended, for example, in Plato's *Republic*. Cf. Vogt "Freundschaft, Unparteilichkeit und Feindschaft," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (4/2001): 517-532.

²⁴ On the difficulty of formulating an account of love that accommodates both love for all and love for specific persons, cf. Smith (2016).

²⁵ Christine Korsgaard, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends," *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 (1992), 305-332; J. David Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," *Ethics* 109 (1999): 338-376; Elijah Millgram, "Kantian Crystallization," *Ethics* 114 (2004): 511-513.

²⁶ This view is implied in much of the 1980s and 90s discussion about morality and impartiality (cf. footnote 5). Augustine articulates another concern: one should not love human beings in ways that are in conflict with a more significant love for God. Cf. Augustine *Confessions* IV. iv(7) – xv (24).

That is, a theory of love and hatred needs to cast the net more widely. One can love and hate not only persons, but also activities, objects, and (dis)values. For example, one can love hiking and hate mowing the lawn.²⁷ One can love one's house and hate one's office. One can love justice and hate arrogance. Moreover, the relevant notion of objects is broad, such that it includes not only artifacts, but also natural entities, artwork, and culturally defined objects. One can love trees and hate snakes, love a given painting and hate a given song, love one's sports team's colors, hate a political movement's symbolism, and so on and so forth.

Beyond this, love of pursuits is a central element of human motivation. In deciding what to do with one's life, one ideally finds something one loves.²⁸ Often this is difficult, because one may not know what one loves and because circumstances limit one's choices. Nevertheless, people often hope to find something—a line of work, a field of study, etc.—the pursuit of which is sustained by love. A designer may say she loves making clothes her clients look great in, a judge's face lights up when she talks about her love for the law, a gardener loves when trees and bushes and flowers grow and look a certain way, and so on. Insofar as love fuels pursuits, it shapes what kinds of lives agents aim to lead. Love as the motivation of pursuits is a complex and comprehensive kind of love. It typically involves other loves.

Consider the pursuit of being a good parent, one of the more widespread pursuits that center on person-directed love. A person may very much want to have a family. She may wish to have children, or adopt children, perhaps also wishing to have a partner with whom to share parenting. Related to loving her children, she loves activities where she spends time with them. She comes to love objects that relate to them, say, the music that her teenage kids introduce her to. She loves values related to raising her children as decent people, and perhaps also values related to the kind of learning and experience she gains from raising children. Or consider a photographer who for 50 years makes photographs in Yosemite National Park. He falls in love with the

²⁷ Smith (2016) offers a wide-ranging list of objects of love.

²⁸ Cf. Vogt (2017) on conceptions of a good life and the role of pursuits in motivation, esp. chapters 5 and 6.

mountains at first sight and, with years of engaging as an artist with them, nature more generally. He loves the process of taking photos and printing the negatives in an ever more elaborate process, capturing the beauty of nature in prints that embody a distinct aesthetic.²⁹ Both examples—parenting and photography—illustrate, we submit, a recognizable and pervasive feature of human motivation. Love of persons, activities, objects, and values may blend in a person’s pursuit.

In all these respects, hatred is analogous. Hatred too can fuel pursuits, as when someone is actively involved in a political group motivated by hatred of some other group. In such pursuits, hatred of persons, activities, objects, and values (or perceived disvalues) may blend, just as love of persons, activities, objects, and values may blend in pursuits of love. Say, in the political case, the agent may hate not only members of an opposing group, but also activities she feels are imposed on her by this group; she may hate objects such as, say, places or symbols associated with the opposing group; the values of the opposing group may to her be hated disvalues.

4. Love and Hatred: Analogues

Here, then, is our account of love and hatred insofar as both play analogous roles in motivation.³⁰ It is intended as covering the broad range of cases of love and hatred we introduced, and is explicitly intended as minimal. More, and different things, will need to be said about different kinds of love—romantic love, parental love, love of activities, and so on. Moreover, it is not strictly speaking an account that puts forward necessary and sufficient conditions for love and hatred. This disclaimer matters because instances of love as well as instances of hatred can differ deeply from each other. Hence our elaboration on conditions (1)-(4) sketches tendencies and typical ef-

²⁹ Say, this photographer might be Ansel Adams.

³⁰ This analysis is indebted both to Samuel Scheffler’s “Valuing” in his *Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Philosophy*, 15-40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; and to Plato’s *Symposium* 199-207; cf. chapter 6 in Vogt (2017).

fects; it does not claim that each of these tendencies and effects applies equally to all cases of love and hatred.³¹

When a person loves X, she

- (1) relates to X,
- (2) sees X in a positive light,
- (3) experiences X-related features of situations as salient and overriding,
- (4) has desires regarding X that affect her overall motivational system.

When a person hates X, she

- (1) relates to X,
- (2) sees X in a negative light,
- (3) experiences X-related features of situations as salient and overriding,
- (4) has desires regarding X that affect her overall motivational system.

Condition (1) states that, when someone loves or hates X, she relates to X. For example, an agent who loves justice relates to an ideal; someone who loves a birch tree in his garden relates to this tree; someone who loves painting loves an activity and/or the activity's characteristic outcomes. On the side of hatred, an agent who hates arrogance relates to a perceived disvalue; someone who hates her country's presumed enemies relates to these enemies; someone who hates mowing the lawn relates to an activity; and so on. These relationships can be reciprocal, as when two friends or enemies love or hate each other, or unreciprocated, as when someone loves the house she built or hates mowing the lawn. They can be hierarchical, as when a parent loves or hates their child, or non-hierarchical, as when siblings love or hate each other.

Condition (2) states that love and hatred target perceived value: what is seen as good and what is seen as bad. We refrain from formulating (2) in terms of beliefs.³² Arguably it is possible

³¹ This disclaimer reflects that the ancient-inspired framework we employ—according to which ethics is concerned with good human lives—is sensitive to human psychology. Accordingly, and to use an Aristotelian term, ethics is concerned with “for the most part regularities” rather than necessary or strict regularities. Cf. Vogt (2017), chapter 7.

³² Relatedly, our account does not envisage reasons *for* love and hatred. Insofar as we are concerned with reasons, these are (in Frankfurt's terms) the reasons *of* love and hatred: the reasons that love and hatred may supply.

to love something, and see it as good, without believing that it is good; or to hate something, and see it as bad, without believing that it is bad. For example, you can love your car and see it as good, and nevertheless realize that it is nostalgia which makes you hang on to a car that is so old that it has become unsafe; in other words, all things considered you believe it is not a good car. Similarly, one can hate broccoli and see it in a negative light and nevertheless refrain from believing that broccoli is bad. One may well realize that broccoli contains valuable nutrients. Yet still one hates broccoli. The way in which seeing in a good or bad light and believing to be good or bad can come apart matters because it is a resource for norms of love and hate. An agent may realize that she should shake off her love for an unsafe car or get over her hatred of broccoli. More generally speaking, one may feel normative pressure to adjust one's love- and hate-attitudes to one's considered value judgments.

Condition (3) says that the agent experiences features of situations that relate to what she loves as salient and overriding.³³ Here our account of love and hatred departs from an account of valuing and disvaluing. Arguably, (1) and (2) also apply to these: one relates to an object that one values or disvalues and sees it as good or bad. Still, an agent can value healthy food without loving healthy food; one can value playing tennis without loving it; one can disvalue healthy food without hating it; and one can disvalue tennis without hating it. Love and hatred are not simply strong instances of liking and disliking. One could like playing the piano very much without loving it; one could dislike one's piano teacher very much without hating him. Think of the phenomenon of liking someone else very much, and yet not being in love with him; sometimes people deplore that they cannot make themselves love someone whom, by all accounts, they like immensely. The difference between liking and love, and disliking and hatred, is not merely one of degree; it is also one in kind. Love and hatred differ from other attitudes that are some mix of evaluative and desiderative by being, as we will put this, fervent. "Fervent" is a figurative word, too fancy—almost—for philosophical analysis. And yet it is precisely the phenomenon that "fer-

³³ Our notion of salience is indebted to John McDowell's view that an agent's set of attitudes makes certain features of situations salient to her. "Virtue and Reason." *The Monist* 62 (1979): 331-350.

vent” refers to that needs to be unpacked. Love and hatred are salient, steering attention and rearranging what is in the foreground of one’s awareness. They have a burning presence in the mind, making other concerns bland or overriding how they are perceived.³⁴

The salience of love and hatred is intact whether or not it manifests in tumultuous ways. Deep and lasting love can be serene; some of the most drastic instances of hatred can be cold.³⁵ Features of situations that relate to the beloved or hated object are motivationally overriding. To take care of a beloved child, one may rearrange one’s whole life, in ways one would not have considered viable prior to being a parent. To be able to create one’s art, one may leave one’s country, where otherwise one would have much reason to stay. Both love and hatred can make an agent’s concerns narrow. Think of the person who, madly in love, no longer keeps in touch with her best friends. Similarly, a person who hates may find herself consumed by her hatred, to the extent that other concerns no longer have a grip on her. In saying that love and hatred override other motivations, we abstain from saying that they supply final reasons. On our account, love and hatred are not final sources of normativity. The appearance to this effect, of course, exists: the motivational force of love and hatred is uncompromising. But this felt necessity is not, or so we argue, normatively foundational.

Condition (4), according to which love and hatred impact an agent’s overall motivational system, is an alternative to views that focus either on occurrent desires or dispositional intentions.³⁶ Accounts that focus on one or the other underestimate, we submit, the ways in which love and hatred shape an agent’s overall motivational system. First, love and hatred typically *structure* the agent’s motivational system. They motivate pursuits, commitments, and other long-term features of agency. Thereby, they push other concerns to the periphery and inform any num-

³⁴ Aristotle says that things don’t appear in the same way to the person who loves and the person who hates. For example, the person one loves seems to have done little or no injustice, while the opposite applies to the person one hates. *Rhetoric* 2.1.1377b30-1378a3. Berit Brogaard engages with recent empirical work on related effects of romantic love (*On Romantic Love*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015).

³⁵ An ancient example of long-standing hatred is Atreus’s killing and cooking of Thyestes’s sons.

³⁶ Niko Kolodny (2003, 151) characterizes the motivational aspects of love as “standing intentions.”

ber of smaller-scale motivations. A person is likely to organize her life around what she loves: she becomes a researcher on wolves because she loves wolves; a parent organizes her daily schedule with a view to taking care of her beloved children. The same applies to hatred. People may join secret organizations devoted to the destruction of what they hate; they structure their lives such as to avoid seeing relatives they hate; and so on. Second, love and hatred typically *color* an agent's overall motivational system. Both exert an expansive influence on the agent's mood, affecting whether she is cheerful, subdued, tense, and so on, even in contexts that are unrelated to the object of love and hatred.

Third, the fervent nature of love and hatred makes agents *resourceful*. Efforts that, absent love and hatred, seem excessive or foolish, occur to the agent as real options. To see the person he loves for barely a few minutes at the station, a soldier may spend his 24 hours of leave with traveling home and back to the front lines across half of Europe. To secure a safe future for the child she loves, a mother may find herself on a refugee boat that is barely seaworthy. Hatred, conversely, may lead an agent to engage in long-term plans of destruction that require ingenious strategies. Love and hatred make people not give up, even when it seems that there are no possible courses of action one can take. To the agent who loves or hates, some further course of action will occur.

In characterizing the motivations of love and hatred this way, we refrain from a claim that is often made: that love is a desire to benefit the beloved, or conversely, that hatred is a desire to harm that which is hated.³⁷ The former characterization is offered in discussions of person-directed love, and both seem suitable for a range of cases. They are not, however, on a sufficiently basic level to be part of a general account. For example, it is controversial what it could mean to benefit artifacts one loves; and it is not clear that one can harm the hated activity of lawn-mowing. Even love of God, which may in many ways be like an attitude toward a person, cannot plausibly be a desire to benefit God. The believer does not think that God needs to be benefited or can

³⁷ Another formulation is sometimes used as almost equivalent: to love X is to wish X well for X's own sake.

be benefited by her. Presumably, there could be similar cases on the human plane, cases where one does not take oneself to be in a position to benefit or harm a person who is loved or hated. In arguing that love and hatred are forceful motivators, we depart from two other theoretical options: to view love (and hatred) as constitutively connected to desired outcomes such as benefit or harm on the one hand, and to view them merely as emotions on the other hand.³⁸

Earlier we suggested that love and hatred are asymmetrical opposites. As far as conditions (1)-(4) are concerned, love and hatred play analogous roles in an agent's motivational system. It would be too strong a claim, however, to say that love and hatred are motivationally analogous in every respect and in every instance. For example, we said that love and hatred color an agent's overall mood. The specifics of this, we submit, can be asymmetrical.³⁹ An agent who has what she loves (is able to engage in an activity she loves, is in a well-going relationship with a person she loves, etc.) is inclined to be in a good mood, even while, say, running errands. An agent who fails to have what she loves is inclined to be in a bad mood, to the extent that quotidian activities can feel like a burden. The opposite does not straightforwardly apply to hatred. Temporal or local distance of a person, activity, etc., may lighten the hater's mood in such cases as hatred of lawn-mowing. Once the task is done, the agent might be on the whole in an improved mood. But in graver instances, it seems that only non-existence of the hatred person, activity, etc., would put the agent into a better mood. While love's effect on mood seems to alter with access to the person, activity, etc., she loves or lack thereof, hatred's effect on mood may alter only according to the more radical difference between existence and non-existence.⁴⁰

³⁸ Velleman rejects the former and defends the view that love is an emotion: "... love is essentially an attitude toward the beloved himself but not toward any result at all." (1999, 354).

³⁹ We are grateful to Isabel Kaeslin for comments on this phenomenon.

⁴⁰ Aristotle thinks that in hating X one desires that X does not exist (*Rhetoric* 2.4.1382a14-15). Though love may also be a pro-attitude to the existence of the beloved, mere existence without access typically does not suffice.

5. The Normative Status of Love and Hatred

Philosophers tend to say little about the normative status of hatred. The normative status of love, however, is a prominent topic, not least due to Harry Frankfurt's contributions. For the purposes of our argument, it would lead astray to reconstruct Frankfurt's views.⁴¹ Instead we engage with a type of position that we call *Final*.

Final: Love supplies final justifications.

According to *Final*, someone's love for her children supplies her with final justificatory reasons.⁴² A parent feels she *must*, for example, run to pick up her child in time. Such "musts," *Final* proposes, are not merely psychological; they do not merely capture the phenomenology of motivating reasons. Instead, the thought goes, they capture the necessity of final norms. That is, *Final* interprets psychological necessity as normative.⁴³ Though we take this to be a mistake, we think *Final* gets important ideas right. Like our account, *Final* takes love to structure a person's motivational system, providing her with manifold motivations for action. It situates love in agential thinking about how to live and in pursuits that come with commitments.⁴⁴ Moreover, *Final* improves on traditional accounts of love by rejecting an overly voluntarist picture. We often *find ourselves* loving someone or something. A parent finds herself loving her child; a photographer finds herself loving, say, photographing in the mountains. These loves are sources of commitments, making normative claims on us.

⁴¹ We don't engage directly, for example, with Frankfurt's view that love is disinterested and directed at particulars (2006). On our conception of love, which includes love of activities, these are not candidates for being general features of love.

⁴² Love for one's children is one of Frankfurt's key examples. Cf. also Vogt (2017) chapter 6 on this example in Plato's *Symposium*.

⁴³ "Love," Frankfurt says, "is the originating source of terminal value (...) the ultimate ground of practical rationality" (55-6).

⁴⁴ Part I in Frankfurt's *The Reasons of Love* is entitled "The Question: 'How Should We Live?'"

And yet *Final* fails. Its failure becomes especially salient once we ask what its implications for hatred are.⁴⁵ *Final* invokes our lived experience of love.⁴⁶ The presumed finality of love's reasons appeals to the felt necessity of the agent's motivations.⁴⁷ Hatred, however, supplies an agent with just the same strongly-felt necessity to act as her hatred commands. Hatred, like love, can be reflectively endorsed. Like love, it can make agents confident and wholehearted in their motivations.⁴⁸ And like love, hatred can supply agents with final ends, providing the agent with a plan for her life and eliminating boredom.⁴⁹ If this is what it takes for norms to arise, *Final* is subject to a *reductio ad absurdum*: it implies that hatred too is a final source of justification, a premise that even those who argue that hatred can supply reasons will reject.⁵⁰ What is needed, then, is a joint account of love's and hatred's normative status.

Should we expect a compelling theory to say that love and hatred offer the same kind of justification for actions? This is not unthinkable. An agent's hatred of broccoli may give her just as much reason not to eat it as her love of reading gives her reason to read. Or should we expect that love and hatred have different normative status, love offering a kind of justification that ha-

⁴⁵ We won't ask how Frankfurt might save love's role as source of normativity without admitting that hatred too is a source of normativity.

⁴⁶ In his review of Frankfurt (2006), Kolodny points out that, in spite of the complex background and framing of Frankfurt's views about the will, personhood, caring, and so on, the argument for love's status as source of normativity simply appeals to this lived experience. "Harry G. Frankfurt: The Reasons of Love," *Journal of Philosophy* 103 (2006): 43-50.

⁴⁷ In Frankfurt's Luther example, Luther says "I can do no other" out of the necessity that comes from endorsing certain values, to the extent that this defines his will ("The Importance of What We Care About," *Synthese* 53 (1982), 257-272). Though this is not an example Frankfurt uses with respect to love, it displays the relevant phenomenology. The agent feels she "must" act in such-and-such a fashion.

⁴⁸ This is how Frankfurt describes love (2006, 65).

⁴⁹ Boredom, Frankfurt argues, is a serious concern. For an agent to find her life meaningful, she needs to have something she cares about and loves (2006, 51-3). Frankfurt says that "[l]oving itself is important to us": it provides our life with final ends and meaning. And yet hatred too can provide a person, as this is sometimes put colloquially, with a reason to live.

⁵⁰ To repeat, we do not claim that Frankfurt lacks resources to respond to this. We make the lesser claim that *Final*, one prominent component of his views, has these implausible implications. Perhaps a defense of Frankfurt may appeal to the way love is rooted in our biology. "The basis for our confidence in caring about our children and our lives is that, in virtue of necessities that are biologically embedded in our nature, we love our children and we love living." (2006, 28-29) And yet, against this one may argue that out-group aggression has as much of a biological history as in-group love.

tred does not supply? This thought too has plausibility. For example, someone's love for their child seems to be a good reason to spend time with the child, play with her, pick her up from school, and so on; someone's hatred for their child seems to be a bad reason to neglect her, leave her unattended, and so on. These considerations speak against the view that both love and hatred justify, and against the view that love justifies and hatred does not. An account is needed that ascribes different normative status to love and hatred, without excluding that hatred can supply justification. One way to do so is to propose that only love, not hatred, justifies in instances that are person-directed, while both justify in cases that are not person-directed.⁵¹ And yet this is also too simple. Think of love for an abusive partner, which fails to supply justification, or hatred of artwork, which does not supply justification to demolish it. A compelling account of the different normative status of love and hatred must accommodate the intuitions that support the different examples cited. To develop such an account, consider first two unsatisfactory options.

Object: Love and hatred have different normative status on account of their objects, the perceived good and the perceived bad respectively.

Attitude: Love and hatred have different normative status qua the attitudes they are.

The problem with *Object* is that love's object is not simply the good, and hatred's object not simply the bad. Instead, love's object is what the lover perceives as good and hatred's object what the hater perceives as bad. In other words, people can love the bad and hate the good. What, then, about *Attitude*, the thought that love is inherently a good and hatred inherently a bad attitude? Insofar as *Attitude* aims to account for the normative status rather than the roles of love and hatred in an agent's psychology, it fails just like *Object*: it simply presupposes that all instances of love are good, and thereby justificatory, and all instances of hatred bad, and thereby not justificatory.

⁵¹ A version of this proposal which distinguishes further between relations of love that are justificatory and others that are not is formulated by Niko Kolodny in "Which Relationships Justify Partiality: General Considerations and Problem Cases," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 38 (2010), 37-75.

The account that is needed, we submit, appreciates the plausible aspects of *Object* and *Attitude*. *Object* gets right that it matters normatively whether an agent pursues the good or the bad. It is in need of revision, however, insofar as the relevant normative force is only in place when the agent perceives as good or bad what in fact is good or bad respectively.⁵² *Attitude* gets right that a compelling account of the normative status of love and hatred must pay attention to the role that a given instance of love and hatred plays in an agent's overall motivational system. Based on these considerations, we propose a view that is realist insofar as it asks whether an agent's motivations track what genuinely is good; and that is at the same time concerned with motivations, insofar as we appeal to an agent's conception of a good life as what guides her small-scale actions and her pursuits.⁵³

6. Conceptions of a Good Human Life

Here, then, is our proposal.

Good Human Life: Love and hatred have different normative status on account of their relationship to a good human life.

Suppose an agent spends much time in a remote research station because she is developing a new device for tracking the nocturnal movements of wolves. Asked why she does this she says she loves wolves and she loves learning about them. Another agent says she is up all night because her child is sick and in need of attention. According to *Final*, these replies illustrate the way in which love justifies: because of love for X, the agent does a, b, c; invoking her love, she seems to have said enough. And yet the impression that she said enough, and that no further justification is needed, is misleading. It arises because in our example something of value is invoked. The pur-

⁵² *Object* is a version of the so-called Principle of Recursion, according to which the pursuit of a good is itself a good and the pursuit of a bad itself a bad. Hurka (2001); Gwen Bradford, "Evil Achievements and the Principle of Recursion," *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* vol. 3. Ed. Mark Timmons (2013), 79-97.

⁵³ This proposal is an Aristotelian alternative to the view that love is justificatory if and insofar as it does not interfere with basic moral norms. Cf. Smith (2016).

suits of the researcher and the parent track something good: knowledge, the child's well-being, etc. Without too much optimism about the degree to which people agree on matters of value, we assume that these and similar things actually are good.⁵⁴ And without too much optimism about the goodness of human beings, we may say that this is rather typical of human pursuits. Lots of people want children and want their children to grow up well. Lots of people want to be good brothers and sisters and sons and daughters and friends and so on, supporting those they love. Lots of people want to do well in some craft or profession, producing good bread or safe journeys for passengers or enjoyable sojourns in cafés or new insights in science. Lots of people want to produce artwork, excel as athletes, contribute to the political or social life of their communities. People take up these pursuits in the light of—however un-articulated—conceptions of a good life for them.

As people go about these pursuits, they may do many things imperfectly.⁵⁵ There is lots of room to fail, more or less, in living up to ethical standards. Nevertheless, typical human pursuits aim at something of value. This is why the response “because I love X” can appear to be a final answer. When people are up all night to attend to a sick child or study wolves, the answer “because I love my child” or “because I love learning about wolves” puts a stop to demands for justification because these pursuits seem to us to track compelling conceptions of a good life. Replies to why-questions that fit this pattern are, in our terms, *locally justificatory*. By this we mean that, in a given situation, an agent has said enough by offering such justifications for her actions. These replies, however, are not *fundamentally justificatory*. A more basic justification lies in the fact that the agent's conception of a good life tracks value.

Lives in which good parenting, good research, good photographs, and so on, are central pursuits, fueled by love, seem good. They may not seem good in a demanding moral sense, or in

⁵⁴ This assessment applies to general and *prima facie* value judgments that permit qualification in particular instances. Say, not all knowledge may be worth gaining; etc.

⁵⁵ We are setting aside related issues about the aspirations and desired achievements that pertain to pursuits. Cf. Agnes Callard, *Aspirations* (forthcoming Oxford University Press) and Gwen Bradford, *Achievements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

the sense of being best. Perhaps a given agent could achieve more by doing something other than what she does. In everyday normative practices, however, we do not hold others to the standard of whether, had they made different choices, they could have achieved more. If the baker says she gets up at 4am because she needs to start baking, we take this to be a sufficient reason. This reason is backed up by the fact that making bread and cake is a valuable thing and by the fact that the agent is a baker. Ethicists and Miss America contestants often use much more ambitious examples when they aim to pick out valuable pursuits: finding a cure for cancer, devoting oneself to alleviating global poverty, world peace, and the like. For the purposes of analyzing how love and hatred motivate, however, more mundane examples suffice. It is a valuable thing to make nutritious and tasty food. And hence someone's love of baking tends to be a perfectly respectable source of motivation. If the agent were to get up at 4am to make poison, the fact that she is highly committed to her pursuits would not be justificatory. The chain of justifications stops with the goodness that typical human pursuits track. Local justification—the immediate reason an agent supplies for her action—fails to be normative if a pursuit does not track anything of value.

Suppose an agent loves to have a fine praline after dinner. Talk of love may be appropriate: she *really* cares, is unhappy if unwittingly she ran out of pralines, and so on. Nevertheless, this love is not at the center of her conception of a good life. It does not inform pursuits: the agent is not a chocolate maker. And this love is also not at the center of her life in a way that involves a mistake: she is not eating pralines all day and on consideration she would say she cares a lot more about her family, her job, and so on. Here love provides local justification. The agent's love tracks something of value, even if the value is comparatively trivial. The pleasure of enjoying a praline is just that, a tiny after-dinner pleasure. The agent puts it at the periphery of her conception of a good life, as it were assigning the right place to it: she loves the praline-for-dessert, but not as she loves, say, her children. That is, these loves of trivia—if recognized as trivia—relate in the right way to the agent's conception of a good life.

The distinction between the center and the periphery of conceptions of a good life helps identify a type of mistake that undermines love's power to locally justify. Agents may love something that would be well-placed at the periphery as if it was a central concern. Suppose that clean floors are valuable, but not in the same way in which the welfare of one's children is. Consider a parent who loves a clean kitchen so much that this makes her love for her children's welfare motivationally ineffective. This type of mistake occurs on a spectrum and can take the form of psychological disorder: think of a parent with compulsive cleaning behavior regularly scrubbing the kitchen floor, even while her children eat at the table. This parent's love of cleanliness is not a source of final justification. It is also not a source of conditional or defeasible justification. It is not the case that the parent has *some* justification, though not all things considered justification, to clean during family meals to make sure the floors are germ-free. If love for a lesser concern crowds out love for more important matters, making the latter impotent, it is not justificatory at all. For love to be locally justificatory, it must get the *location* of a concern right.

Consider again our agent who hates broccoli. Talk of hatred, let us stipulate, is not overblown: she goes out of her way to avoid eating it, cannot enjoy a meal if broccoli is anywhere nearby, and has been seen hiding her portion of broccoli in flowerpots at her hosts' house, only to get out of the felt obligation that she eats it. Moreover, we take it (and perhaps the agent herself takes it) that she is making a mistake. Broccoli is a valuable source of nutrients; one may wish to be habituated to like it. This is a case of hatred for the good. Nevertheless, and for the reasons explained regarding love of trivia, we take it that "I don't eat broccoli because I hate broccoli" is a justificatory response. It is not a final response: the agent's reply is locally justificatory only because of its triviality. Someone can lead a perfectly good life without eating broccoli. A perfect agent may habituate herself such as to like everything that is in fact good for her. But we do not hold people to such rigorous standards. If hatred of broccoli is at the periphery of someone's conception of a good life for her, while at the center are pursuits that track value, we think this is just fine. More generally, agents can love and hate in ways that involve mistaken per-

ceptions of value, and nevertheless their love or hatred is part of a conception of a good life that, as a whole, tracks value. In such cases, love and hatred can be locally justificatory.

Consider next a case where an agent gets evaluative matters wrong in ways that relate to the center of his conception of a good life. He takes the good to be bad, hates it, and makes it his life's pursuit to fight against what he hates. A racist views a certain group of people in a negative light and hates them, while in fact—and here we invoke another moral judgment we take to be uncontroversial—all human beings have a distinctive kind of positive value. His hatred provides neither final nor defeasible reasons. It does not provide normative reasons at all.

Consider finally hatred of the bad, say, tyranny. If it is someone's pursuit in life to work toward removing a tyrant from power, this pursuit seems to track something of value; the fact that she is motivated by hatred may strike us, ultimately, as not doing away with this. Notwithstanding the concern that hatred may be destructive also for the agent's own psychology, we tend to have a hard time condemning this person's pursuit. Witness, say, the gratitude that many people feel toward those who worked in the resistance against the Nazis. Suppose it is at the center of an agent's conception of a good life to resist an evil tyranny, and in her case this pursuit is fueled by her hatred of its badness. This agent may strike us as less than perfect; a better agent, perhaps, would fight against evil without hating it. But the agent's conception of a good life does not strike us as deeply or evidently misguided. After all, she is aiming for significant improvements that ultimately affect the lives of many. Our account captures precisely this ambivalence. Insofar as the agent's conception of a good life tracks something good, her local justifications seem to us to provide reasons rooted in a conception of a good life we cannot simply reject.

Questions of whether hatred of the bad justifies often arise in domains where norms undergo change. Suppose an agent hates catcalling and this hatred feeds into her scholarly work on discrimination. A colleague holds that catcalling is merely a trivial matter, aiming to undermine some of the scholar's motivation.⁵⁶ The mistake that they both make in each others' eyes is not

⁵⁶ We owe this example to Christine Susienka.

that they take the good to be bad or the bad to be good. Presumably, both think that catcalling is bad. Rather, the mistakes they take each other to make reside in where they locate the badness of catcalling: at the center or the periphery of what matters to them. In the eyes of the first scholar her colleague underestimates the relevance of catcalling; in the eyes of the second scholar, her colleague makes too much of it. On our account, hatred of catcalling is locally justificatory if it is rightly placed as relating to matters worthy of being at the center of an agent's life.

7. Conclusion

When love and hatred are studied together, we argued, the goal is not merely to add an account of hatred to an account of love. Instead, it is to find resources for revising what otherwise may appear to be a plausible analysis of love. Specifically, it seems compelling that love has distinctive motivational force. Love structures an agent's motivational system and makes demands on the agent. And yet the same is true for hatred. This observation calls for a reconsideration of the view that love justifies. Love and hatred, we submit, can at best offer local justifications. These local justifications come with felt necessity: the agent feels that she must do such-and-such, on account of her love or her hatred. But this sense of necessity does not capture the normative status of love and hatred. Whether a given case of love or hatred locally justifies depends on its relation to an agent's conception of a good life. This proposal improves on theories of love that neglect love's opposite, hatred. It also improves on two normative views that appear too simple. On our account, it is not just fine to hate the bad. This view, we argue, neglects the pernicious power of hatred and it is insufficiently attuned to the fact that agents are prone to make mistakes about what is and is not bad. On our view, it is also not the case that all hatred is bad. This view, we argue, neglects that certain instances of hatred seem harmless and that other instances of hatred fuel pursuits that track matters of the greatest importance, such as a country's liberation from tyranny. A

plausible account of love and hatred, we submit, must accommodate the kinds of cases we analyzed.