

Ancient Skepticism

Why assume that ancient skepticism made a contribution to the history of moral philosophy? Skepticism, it may appear, is first and foremost concerned with knowledge. Ancient skepticism, however, belongs to a Socratic strand in philosophy that refuses to draw a line between epistemology and ethics. Truth is taken to be so high a value that the good life must be a life of investigation. If there are norms of overriding importance, these are epistemic norms. But these norms are thought to bear immediately on whether one leads a good life. In other words, how to live is taken to be a question of how to think. In this chapter, I will focus on four topics: truth as an end (section 1); agency (section 2); disagreement (section 3); and the nature of value (section 4).

Before I begin, here is a minimal sketch of the protagonists. ‘Ancient skepticism’ refers to two philosophical movements. First, Academic skepticism, which emerges in Plato’s Academy as a way of reading Plato and of adopting Socratic modes of investigation. Arcesilaus (316/5–241/0 BCE) and Carneades (214–129/8 BCE), both of them heads of the Academy, are its most prominent figures. Academic skepticism exerts influence on later thinkers mostly through Cicero (106 BCE–43 BCE), who writes two treatises called *Academica* and sees himself as doing philosophy in Academic spirit. Most of our knowledge about Academic skepticism derives from his writings, as well as from Pyrrhonian discussions about the differences between the two outlooks. Second, Pyrrhonian skepticism, which is rooted in long-standing metaphysical discussions about

appearances. Pyrrho (365/60–275/70 BC), the thinker in whose name later skeptics refer to themselves as ‘Pyrrhonian’, is almost a sage-like figure. He is less a founder of a school than an inspirer of successors, spread out over several centuries. Aenesidemus (first century BCE) and Agrippa (1st to 2nd century CE) devise famous modes of argument—the Ten Modes and the Five Modes—to be employed in skeptical investigation. The most comprehensive and sophisticated account of Pyrrhonian skepticism is formulated by Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160–210 CE). His *Outlines of Skepticism* (PH 1) offers a general account of skepticism. Sextus’ further treatises consist of books on logic, standardly referred to as PH 2 and M 7-8, physics, PH 3.1-167 and M 9-10, ethics, PH 3.168-281 and M 11; and six books on other disciplines such as grammar and rhetoric (M1-6). Pyrrhonian skepticism shares much with Academic skepticism. Both are inspired by sophistic and Socratic modes of argument: arguing ‘for both sides’ of an issue (*pros amphotera*); ‘dialectically’ exploring the premises of one’s opponent without embracing them; and refuting proposals made by one’s interlocutors.¹

1. Truth as an End

The Greek word *skepsis* means investigation. This is what the skeptics, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, most centrally are: investigators. Sextus compares the skeptics to other

¹ I refer to Sextus’ writings as “SE P1-3” and “SE M1-11”; and to Cicero’s *Academica* in Charles Brittain’s edition (*Cicero: on Academic Scepticism*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006). “DL” stands for Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Book 9 in DL provides a detailed account of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Further evidence is collected in A.A. Long and D. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers Vols. 1 and 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), abbreviated as LS. At times, I refer the reader to whole chapters in LS. “LS40,” for example, references the chapter that collects fragments on the Stoic-Academic debate about criteria of truth. “LS40A” refers to the first entry in that chapter.

philosophers, many of whom take themselves to have found the truth. The skeptics call them dogmatists (*dogmatikoi*), which literally means ‘those who put forward theories’.

Next, there is a camp that should not be confused with skepticism, namely those who declare things to be inapprehensible. For the skeptic, this counts as dogmatism.

Something is said to be the case, whereas skeptics do not make claims about the way things are. Contrary to these other philosophers, the skeptics continue to investigate.²

Not only philosophers make assertions about ‘how things are’. In ordinary life, cognizers accept any number of things as true that may turn out to be false. Hellenistic

epistemologists, that is, those philosophers who are the skeptics’ interlocutors, share with the skeptics the observation that it is difficult not to assent when appearances are

compelling or when views are appealing. For the skeptics, this means that methods of argument must be developed that, on the one hand, prevent one from assent in everyday

matters, and that on the other hand can be employed to test philosophical theories. In Academic skepticism, these methods resemble Socratic techniques, as well as Epicurean

methodology for examining impressions before judging something to be the case.³ In

Pyrrhonian skepticism, the Five Modes, Two Modes and Modes against Causal

Explanations address the arguments that are employed to support theories (PH 1.164-186;

DL 88-89). The Ten Modes target appearances, understood in a broad sense: something

² PH 1.1.; cf. Cicero *Acad.* 2.7-8 for Academic skepticism.

³ Cicero’s discussion of Academic skepticism provides a general and detailed picture. Carneades develops a methodology for testing impressions that resembles Epicurean scientific methodology (cf. LS18).

appears, either in a sensory or non-sensory way, to be so-and-so (PH 1.36-163; DL 79-88).

Both Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics describe the state of mind that is generated by their investigations as suspension of judgment, *epochê*. This term presupposes Stoic philosophy of mind. According to Stoic premises, sense-perceptions and theoretical thoughts are impressions, *phantasiai*. Impressions move the mind toward or away from assent. There are three ways a cognizer can respond to an impression: assent, rejection, and suspension of judgment. Epistemic norms—norms of how to attain knowledge and avoid anything lesser than knowledge—are norms of assent. That is, a central component of Stoic philosophy addresses when and how one should (and should not) assent.⁴

Plato's Academy turns skeptical in a phase of intense epistemological debate. Arcesilaus overlaps in the Academy with Zeno, founder of Stoicism. The Stoics understand themselves as Socratics, rejecting the Forms as well as Plato's tripartite psychology. They embrace the views that the soul is reason and that virtue is knowledge. Knowledge of everything that pertains to life, namely physics, ethics, and logic, literally constitutes virtue (Aetius I, Preface 2, LS 26A). This systematic body of knowledge is hard to attain. In order to make progress toward knowledge, epistemic norms must be observed. One should assent as a perfect cognizer—a 'sage'—would. This wise person does not hold any beliefs, *doxai*. When she accepts something as true, her assent constitutes a piece of

⁴ Most of the relevant evidence is collected in LS, chapters 39, 40, 41 and 53.

knowledge. She assents only when she has a so-called cognitive impression, an impression that makes it clear that it presents things precisely as they are (DL 7.46, 54; Cicero *Acad.* 1.40–1, 2.77– 8; SE M 7.247–52). The cognitive impression is the Stoics' so-called criterion of truth.

But what makes an impression 'cognitive'? Indeed, is there such a thing as a cognitive impression? And more generally, is there *any* criterion of truth? A criterion of truth, as Hellenistic epistemologists conceive of it, is crucial to the pursuit of knowledge. There are some impressions, the Stoics argue, that one can safely accept; though they may be few, one can build systematic knowledge by 'collecting' only those thoughts that are cognitive. The Epicureans argue that sense-perceptions are criteria of truth. Every sense-perception is true in the sense that it physically occurs: an image hits the eye, sound the ear, and so on; theories that are in conflict with sense-perception are to be rejected. But what if there is no criterion of truth, nothing that can safely be taken to be true just by itself? Another option may be to put forward proofs for one's theories and build knowledge from there. The criterion of truth on the one hand, and theories of proof on the other hand, are contentious topics for debates between skeptics and dogmatists.

When Sextus explains the motivation of skepticism, he describes the skeptics as philosophers: people who want to find out what is true and false (PH 1.12). They end up in on-going investigation, though not because they prefer suspension of judgment over discovery; they would like to find the truth. But as of yet, investigation continues because

neither the dogmatists' criteria of truth nor their proofs appear compelling. Scholars dispute, however, whether this description is a good fit for philosophers who devise techniques that regularly lead to suspension of judgment. Truth and suspension of judgment may appear to be competing ends. Worse, some passages in Sextus suggest that Pyrrhonian skeptics pursue yet another end, namely a good life, understood as tranquility.⁵

To see how the ends of good life, truth, and suspension of judgment interrelate, turn briefly to Socrates. In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says that an unexamined life is not worth living (38a5-6). Human beings have one eminently important task: to aim to lead a good life. But the question of how to live well is difficult. Those who presumably are experts—priests, sophists, and others whom Socrates talks to—cannot produce coherent answers. Investigation regularly leads into puzzles and perplexities. In response, one could turn away from investigation, as some of Socrates' interlocutors in early dialogues do. Notably, this is not Socrates' reaction. As difficult as it appears to be to lead a life guided by reason, this is what he argues needs to be attempted. That is, Socrates aims for a good life; for now, he must settle for a second-best life, namely one of on-going investigation instead of one that is based on knowledge of good and bad; he methodically arrives at

⁵ Cf. Richard Bett, "Scepticism and Ethics," in Bett, *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Skepticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 181-194; Gisela Striker, "Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 83 (2001): 113-129; Katja Maria Vogt, *Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 5 "The Aims of Skeptical Investigation," 119-139.

puzzlement which sustains this second-best state; and he is fundamentally motivated by the value of truth.

This is, roughly, the blueprint for the idea that a life of investigation is a pursuit of a good life. Both Arcesilaus and Sextus argue that skeptics live ‘rightly’.⁶ Suspension of judgment, though worse than discovery, is the best available state of mind as long as discovery has not been attained. Augustine, who is acquainted with Academic skepticism via Cicero, puts his finger on precisely this point. His *Contra Academicos* takes this to be the crucial question by which to assess skepticism: whether it is possible to live happily without discovery of the truth, assuming that this discovery is what one’s whole life is geared towards. Though a life of knowledge would be even better, the skeptics’ reply, as I have sketched it, is “yes.”

2. Agency

The dogmatists take themselves to have a damning objection against this sketch of the skeptics’ life: agency is not possible without assent. Why does the skeptic walk through a door in order to leave a room, rather than run into the surrounding wall? As the dogmatists see it, one must assent to the impression “there is the door” in order to successfully leave a room (Plutarch *Adv. Col.* 1122A-F; LS 69A). Moreover, or so the argument continues, in order to decide what to do, say, whether or not to leave the room, an agent must assent to the thought that *this* is what she will do. That is, in order to

⁶ Cf. M 7.158 and Cic. *Acad.* 2.37-9 for Academic skepticism; PH 1.16-17 for Pyrrhonian skepticism.

survive and to lead an active life, agents must assent to impressions about how the world is and to impressions about what they should be doing. Beliefs about the world as well as evaluative and normative beliefs are indispensable for action, or so the dogmatists argue.⁷

The responses of Pyrrhonians and Academics to this so-called Apraxia Charge differ.⁸

Pyrrhonian skeptics follow appearances (PH 1.21-24). Adherence to appearances involves letting oneself be guided by affections, say, eating when hungry. It also involves learning skills by doing things the way they are done. Moreover, custom and law are considered appearances of a sort: the skeptic can go along with them. This last point has earned the skeptics much criticism. Hegel, among others, pointed out that Pyrrhonian skepticism is essentially conformist.⁹ If one does not take a stand on how to act, and escapes inactivity simply by adhering to customary ways, one presumably leads a highly conventional life. The ancient version of this objection employs the following example, reminiscent of twentieth century discussions about obedience in pernicious regimes: if a skeptic is asked by a tyrant to perform an unspeakable deed or else suffer the death

⁷ The past three decades of scholarship on ancient skepticism take their starting-point from a paper by Michael Frede, where Frede argues that the skeptics take themselves to have responses to the charge that without belief they cannot act. “Des Skeptikers Meinungen,” *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, 15/16 (1979): 102–29. Reprinted as “The Sceptic’s Beliefs,” in Burnyeat and Frede, *The Original Sceptics* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1997), 1-24.

⁸ See Vogt, “Scepticism and Action,” in Bett (2010), 165-180.

⁹ Cf., for example, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A.V Miller, analysis and foreword J.N Findlay (OUP, 1977), par. 205.

penalty, it is assumed that the skeptic will obey.¹⁰ Against this, skeptics argue that appearances can go either way (M 11.166). If the skeptic grew up in an environment of rebellious spirit, it may appear to her that resistance against a tyrannical regime is ‘what one does’. This response, however, does not persuade many of the merits of a Pyrrhonian skeptic’s life. The skeptics must admit that it is up to chance which way appearances guide her, not a matter of considering reasons for and against courses of action.

Arguably, Academic skepticism does better on this count. Arcesilaus and Carneades formulate criteria of action. The skeptics adhere to the ‘reasonable’ or to the ‘convincing’. The reasonable, Arcesilaus’ criterion, is roughly that which appears to an agent based on her best thinking about a given question (SE M7.158; 7.150). One’s best thinking is likely to fall short of getting things right. And yet the skeptic aims to deliberate as best as she can. Carneades’ criterion, the convincing, is a sophisticated philosophical proposal, perhaps even intended as a criterion of truth, not merely of action (SE M7.166–84). It is assumed that, in any number of contexts, we can just go with how things look; not much is at stake. But there are matters of importance in life. In these cases one ought to examine one’s impressions. If you enter a dark room and some item looks like a rolled-up rope, do take a stick and poke at it, for perhaps it is a snake. The more something seems to matter, the more carefully one may deliberate.

¹⁰ This is a much-debated example in ancient philosophy, perhaps in part inspired by Socrates, who is reported to have been commanded by the Thirty Tyrants to arrest an innocent man, which he refused to do. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1, 1110a5-8.

Notably, this proposal does not acknowledge cases where, given how much is at stake and given how the arguments play out, we have fully understood what is right and wrong. Consider what the ancient skeptics would say in response to an argument often made against contemporary moral skepticism: you say you are doubting whether there is any moral knowledge; but don't you know any number of moral truths, for example, that slavery is wrong? In response, today's moral skeptics may have to admit that they know this, as well as some similar moral truths. Thus they stand refuted. Academic skeptics, assuming they were around today, would react differently. They would argue that it took our culture quite long to agree that slavery is wrong. Rather than pride ourselves on this achievement we should suspect that it remains preliminary. They might point out that it may well be the case that any number of goods we buy today are produced under conditions that, if only we had a better understanding of what slavery is and why it is wrong, we would condemn and classify as slavery. So we should step back from seeing our current views as moral truths. Moreover, they would point out that they are not in the business of doubting what to others appears certain. They are investigating questions that, if others only paused to consider them, would appear also to them as worthy of further thought. Today's anti-skeptics may insist that even preliminary insights are insights. And yet as moralists they may also concede that the ancient commitment to investigation has some appeal: it pulls away from self-congratulatory notions of moral progress, and directs one's attention to what remains under-explored.

3. Disagreement

Early ancient ethicists consider disagreement a widespread phenomenon that philosophy has to respond to. Their starting-point is thus quite different from the starting-point of moral philosophers in the Christian era, who tend to assume that we largely agree in our moral notions, so that the task of philosophy is to clarify them. Arguably, this is one of the reasons why ethics of the sophistic-Socratic tradition is relevant to contemporary discussions. Today's ethicists also aim to address diversity, disagreement, and difference.

In the 5th century BC, Herodotus as well as the sophists explore how one ought to respond to the fact that different people live according to different customs. Herodotus cites Pindar's saying "custom is king." He interprets the quote, suggesting that custom makes people believe that their own ways of doing things are natural while foreign ways are not only false, but unnatural and repellent. For example, Herodotus says, the Greeks burn their dead, while the Callatians eat them (*Histories* 3.38). Each consider their own funeral rites natural, and are disgusted by what others do. Once this observation is on the table, reliance on one's own commitment to one's customs and on one's abhorrence of other customs appears arbitrary. As philosophers today put it, those who disagree appear to be epistemic peers: we ourselves are in no obvious way better suited to having found out how to live than other people.

Some of the sophists are associated with the contrast between nature and law, *phusis* and *nomos*, and with the resulting challenge regarding the naturalness of one's own customs. Moreover, the sophists are experts in a method of question-and-answer. The sophist asks

his interlocutor “is X A or B?”, say, “is virtue teachable or natural?” The interlocutor has to choose one answer and defend it. He loses if he ends up confused or contradicting himself upon further interrogation; he wins if the questioner is at a loss or contradicts himself. These themes and techniques are similar to Socrates’s, as he is presented in Plato’s dialogues and as the skeptics see him. In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates points out that, when it comes to value, we have no established methods of resolving disagreement (7c-8a). Disagreement, moreover, occurs not just between different groups or peoples. It further occurs—and this takes center stage for Socrates—within the minds of individual cognizers, who regularly fail in sorting out their views about value.

One event in Carneades’ life illustrates how Academic skeptics kept these preoccupations alive. Carneades was chosen, as one of three philosophers, to visit Rome in 155 BC as ambassador from Athens. He disturbed the Romans with the following stunt. One day, he gave a speech advocating justice, to great acclaim. The next day, he gave a speech against justice, and was similarly persuasive. His aim in doing so, presumably, was to draw attention to the fact that the defenders of justice do not have the knowledge they claim to have, and that the nature of justice is as of yet ill understood (Lactantius, *Epitome* 55.8, LS 68M). In response, Carneades and his fellow-philosophers were expelled from Rome. With them, philosophy earned a bad reputation. However, when philosophy gained cultural relevance in Rome, Cicero, one of its main disseminators, picked up precisely where the Athenian embassy had left off. Arguably, philosophy was essentially associated with the very ideas that Carneades put on display: there are arguments for several sides of

an issue, and one benefits from thinking through them with an open mind. Thus Cicero not only writes about Academic skepticism and claims to belong to this school. He also structures treatises of eminent influence in the Western tradition, among them *On Duties* and *On Ends*, as conversations between different philosophical parties, each of which is allowed to develop their point of view in detail.

Sextus defines skepticism as an ability to put appearances and thoughts into opposition. Suspension of judgment follows because, presumably, the arguments or appearances on both sides of any given question are of equal strength (PH 1.8). However, would it not seem that, more often than not, the opposing sides are unlikely to be of equal weight? The skeptic's reply is that skepticism is an argumentative ability. The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus provide tools for systematically putting into opposition appearances with appearances, appearances with thoughts, and thoughts with thoughts. This third option for generating suspension of judgment, which focuses on different theoretical proposals, is called "the mode of disagreement (*diaphônia*)" in Agrippa's Five Modes.

How do these matters apply to ethics? The Tenth Mode generates suspension of judgment on customs, laws, religious beliefs, and doctrines about matters of value. Consider two of Sextus' examples, prayer and incest. Most people pray to the gods and are committed to this practice. However, Epicurus argues that the gods are elevated beings, too lofty to care for human prayer. If only you think through his arguments carefully, they seem as compelling as the practice of prayer (PH 1.155). Second, incest is condemned by Greek

law. And yet the Stoics argue that there are cases where a wise person commits incest, and they cite actions of Olympian gods as evidence that this is not an outrageous proposal (PH 1.160 and 3.245). In both cases, one side of the opposition initially looks stronger: custom supports prayer and condemns incest. But arguments can be raised that give you pause, and that create a balance between two sides of the issue. Admittedly, skeptical oppositions at times read like collections of monstrosities and far-fetched illustrations.¹¹ In response, one may dismiss some of them as unsuccessful: there simply is no equal balance between the two sides. Or one may admit that there is something to the skeptic's enterprise: perhaps serious thought about value does take imagination and a willingness to entertain alien points of view.

4. The Nature of Value

Ancient skepticism is not committed to any metaphysical claim about value. That is, skeptical investigation neither implies what today we might call anti-realism, that there are no evaluative facts, nor realism, that there are facts of the matter about what is valuable. Skeptical formulations, however, can seem to imply both of these positions. Indeed, Sextus' writings about ethics are particularly hard to assess. At times Sextus argues that, if agents disagree about the good, then there is nothing good by nature (e.g. PH 3.179). This is a metaphysical, and therefore non-skeptical claim. The best available reading of these passages says that here Sextus is integrating older Pyrrhonian material, inherited from Pyrrho and Aenesidemus, without adjusting it sufficiently to his own

¹¹ Cf. Vogt (2008), 20-64.

general outlook.¹² Sextus' considered formulations say what skeptical investigators should say, and what Academics say: disagreement leads to suspension of judgment and on-going investigations about value. But what about the other option, that skepticism implies a realist metaphysics? If investigation aims to find out the truth about value and the good life, this may presuppose that such a truth exists. Arguably, the skeptics aim to stay clear also of this implication. Investigation is open-ended both with respect to what is true and false *and* with respect to whether there are truths and falsehoods to be discovered.

Consider now the structure and upshot of Sextus' treatises on ethics, as compared to his treatises on logic and physics. In logic, there are two main questions, both of which affect any topic a philosopher may address: whether there is a criterion of truth, and whether there is a theory of proof. Sextus' discussions in physics cover major topics of ancient natural philosophy: whether there is motion, rest, void, causation, and so on. If suspension of judgment on all these questions was added up, the skeptic would quite generally suspend judgment on any and all aspects of the physical world. Sextus' treatises on ethics divide into two halves: on whether there is anything good, bad, and indifferent by nature; and on whether there is an art of life. If they are written with similar ambitions as those on logic and physics, these two questions should exhaustively cover the discipline. That is, a reconstruction of Sextus' project has to explain how these two

¹² Cf. Richard Bett's reconstruction of both Sextus' writings on ethics and of Pyrrho's and Aenesidemus' metaphysical views. *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

questions exhaust the domain of ethics—or else the treatises on ethics are less systematic than those on logic and physics. Consider how this might work.

The basic question of ancient ethics is how to lead a good life. A Socratically-inspired premise of Stoic philosophy—that is, of the skeptics' main interlocutors—is that knowledge of good and bad is both necessary and sufficient for leading a good life. That is, the person who knows what is good and bad and is thereby an 'expert' for living well, leads a good life. Accordingly, there are two ways in which a philosopher could demonstrate that there is ethical knowledge: either by laying out theories in such a way that no fault can be found with the arguments; or by pointing to a person who leads a good life. This person, if she existed, would have to be in possession of, as Sextus puts it, the 'art' (*technê*) of life. Sextus' treatises on ethics target precisely these two options and are thus systematic in the same way as the treatises on logic and physics. Under the heading "is there anything good, bad, and indifferent by nature?" Sextus examines theories of the good life, generating suspension of judgment at each step of his investigation. Under the heading "is there an art of life?" he asks whether the 'product' of such an art, namely some agents who lead good lives, can be found. If not, then there is no art of life, or so the premises of his dogmatic interlocutors say. And if both questions lead to suspension of judgment, then the question of how to live well needs further investigation.

Conclusion

What, then, is the role of ancient skepticism in the history of moral philosophy? As I hope to have shown, the skeptics lead a life of on-going investigation, claiming that they are at ease even though the truth has not been found. In this, they are not unlike scientists today, who happily engage in research, and who would be quite disturbed by the suggestion that they should be miserable only because science has not yet found out the truth about the universe. Ethics, according to ancient skepticism, is like this: an on-going project of aiming to find out how to live, a project that is none the worse for not yet having been concluded.

Works Cited and Further Reading

Annas, J. and J. Barnes (2000), *Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, J. (1997), *The Toils of Scepticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bett, R. (1997), *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (2000), *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— “Pyrrho,” in E. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2002: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/pyrrho/>, revised version 2006, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/pyrrho/>

— (2010) (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (2010a), “Scepticism and Ethics,” in Bett (2010), 181-194.

Brittain, C. (2005), “Arcesilaus,” in E. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arcesilaus/>.

— *Cicero: on Academic Scepticism* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006).

Broadie, S. and C. Rowe (2002), *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translation, Introduction, and Commentary*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burnyeat, M. and Frede, M. (1997), *The Original Sceptics*, Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett.

Cooper, J. (2004), “Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic” in V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Year of Socrates 2001—Proceedings*, Athens: European Cultural Center of Delphi. Reprinted in Cooper (2004), *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good, Essays on Ancient Philosophy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 81-103.

Frede, M. (1979), “Des Skeptikers Meinungen,” *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, 15/16: 102–29. Reprinted as “The Sceptic’s Beliefs,” in Burnyeat and Frede (1997), 1-24.

— (1983), “Stoics and Sceptics on clear and distinct impressions,” in M. Burnyeat (ed.) (1983), *The Skeptical Tradition*, Berkeley: University of California Press: 65-94.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977), *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A.V Miller, analysis and foreword J.N. Findlay, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, P. (1995), *Augustine, Against the Academicians and The Teacher*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.

Long, A. A. (2006), *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Long, A. A. and D. Sedley (1987), *The Hellenistic Philosophers Vols. 1 and 2*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [abbreviated LS].

Striker, G. (1996), *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (2001), “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 83: 113-129.

— (2010), “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in Bett (2010), 195-207.

Vogt, K. (2008), *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa*, New York: Oxford University Press.

— (2010), “Scepticism and Action,” in Bett (2010), 165-180.

— (2010b) “Ancient Skepticism,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2010 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/>>.

— (2012), *Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato*, New York: Oxford University Press.